Fraudulent Claim of Social Welfare Benefits: Warden v The Queen

This case involved an appeal to the Court of Appeal (Supreme Court of Victoria) by Lyn Warden against the sentence imposed on her by the Country Court for obtaining a financial advantage by deception from a Commonwealth entity, contrary to section 134.2(1), Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (see my previous post on this case). Ms Warden was engaged full-time as an independent contractor to the Hobsons Bay City Council providing family day care services to children in her home while receiving a Disability Support Pension. 

Before the Court of Appeal Ms Warden sought leave to appeal against her sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive because insufficient weight was given by the County Court judge to:

• her age and lack of prior criminal history;
• the circumstances in which the offending occurred;  
• the application of the Verdins principles; 
• her remorse and low risk of re-offending; and 
• her prospects of rehabilitation.

 

The Court refused her application for leave to appeal against the sentence imposed:

In my opinion, it is not reasonably arguable that the sentence is manifestly excessive.The matters upon which the Crown has relied in combination demonstrate that the sentence is well within the range of sentencing options that was open to the judge.  In particular, having regard to the prolonged period over which the offending occurred and the large amount of money involved, the offending can only be regarded as serious. There are many members of the community who, like the applicant, are motivated by desire to financially provide for their families.  However, unlike the applicant, the vast majority do so honestly rather than by resorting to calculated and prolonged courses of fraudulent conduct. 
I do not accept the applicant’s submission that the judge gave insufficient weight to the mitigating factors upon which she relied.  When the serious nature of the offending is considered in the light of the maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment, one would ordinarily expect a sentence greater than 3 years’ imprisonment and the custodial component of the sentence to exceed 14 months.  The fact that the judge imposed the sentence that she did can only be explained on the basis that she gave full weight to those mitigating factors.
While so-called comparable cases are not precedents and care must be exercised in how they are used to assess the appropriateness of a sentence in a given case...the sentences imposed in the cases of Leighton, Barton and Pham, upon which the Crown has relied, indicate that the sentence imposed by the judge is consistent with current sentencing practices and is not manifestly excessive. (paras. 38-41).